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Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A
Reasonable Interpretation of
"Reasonable Accommodations"
by
LISA E. KEY*
Introduction
An individual who smokes a pack of cigarettes a day develops
lung cancer. Another who is completely deaf refuses to undergo sur-
gery recommended by his physician to receive a cochlear implant that
will enable him to hear. A third person with diabetes refuses to follow
her prescribed diet, causing her health to deteriorate. Each of these
people has a disability. Yet, their disabilities were caused, continue to
exist, or are being worsened as a result of their own voluntary
conduct.
This Article will address the question of whether a person with a
"voluntary" disability (i.e., one that was caused, continues to exist, or
is worsened by that person's voluntary conduct) is entitled to the full
protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (the
"ADA"), particularly in the private employment context. Part I will
briefly describe the purpose and mechanics of the ADA. Part II will
then explore some of the public policy arguments for limiting the
scope of the ADA with respect to persons with voluntary impair-
ments. I will argue that a distinction should be made between persons
with impairments that are immutable, even though originally caused
by voluntary conduct, and persons with impairments that are mutable,
either because they could be eliminated or reduced if some sort of
voluntary conduct were taken or because they are being exacerbated
as a result of voluntary conduct. My analysis will demonstrate that the
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
coverage of the ADA should be restricted only with respect to individ-
uals with mutable impairments. Part II will conclude by offering two
possible alternatives to limit the scope of the ADA.
The first of these alternatives, excluding certain voluntary impair-
ments from the definition of "disability," will be discussed in Part In.
I will conclude that this alternative is not practical. Part IV will ex-
amine the second alternative, which is to require consideration of the
actions of an individual with a mutable impairment in the analysis of
what accommodations are reasonable. I will assert that this alterna-
tive satisfies many of the public policy concerns raised by giving full
protection under the ADA to persons with voluntary impairments.
Further, I will suggest that it could easily be implemented by borrow-
ing concepts from the well-developed area of avoidable consequences
under tort law.
I will conclude with two recommendations. First, courts should
not make determinations of whether an accommodation is reasonable
in a vacuum, in which only the circumstances and actions of the ac-
commodator are considered. Rather, each situation should be viewed
in its entirety, and the conduct of an individual with a mutable impair-
ment should be a factor of great importance. Second, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") should promulgate
regulations directing consideration of the conduct of a person with a
mutable impairment as a factor in assessing the reasonableness of an
accommodation.2
I. The Basic Framework of the ADA
The purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination against
persons with disabilities by providing clear, strong, consistent, en-
forceable standards prohibiting such discrimination.3 The ADA is di-
2. Rulemaking authority under the ADA has been delegated to several different fed-
eral agencies, depending on the particular subject matter involved. The EEOC is author-
ized to issue regulations governing private employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
The Department of Justice is designated as the agency with authority to issue regulations
with respect to the provision of programs and services, other than transportation services,
by state and local governments, 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a), and by public accommodations and
commercial facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). The Department of Transportation has
rulemaking authority with respect to provisions governing transportation services. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12149(a), 12186(a). The focus of this Article is on discrimination in the work-
place and the accommodations required of private employers. Thus, the recommendations
provided in the Conclusion are directed at the EEOC. However, other provisions of the
ADA raise similar issues and the solutions proposed by this Article are relevant to these
provisions as well.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2).
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vided into five titles, each prohibiting discrimination against
individuals with disabilities, but in different contexts. Title I prohibits
discrimination by private employers4 and is the focus of this Article.5
To be entitled to the protections of Title I, a person must be a
qualified individual with a disability.6 A person is an individual with a
disability if he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity, has a record of such an impairment, or is
regarded as having such an impairment.7 Major life activities are
those basic activities that the average person in the general population
can perform with little or no difficulty, "such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working."8 An individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity if he is unable to perform that activity in the same
manner, under the same conditions, or for the same amount of time as
an average person in the general population.9 Factors to be consid-
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Title II prohibits discrimination in the provision of pro-
grams, services, and activities by state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150.
Title III prohibits discrimination by public accommodations, such as hotels, restaurants,
retail stores, museums, parks, and health clubs, in the provision of goods and services. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. Title IV provides for telecommunications for people with hearing
and speech disabilities and for closed-captioning of public service announcements. 47
U.S.C. §§ 201-229 (1994). Title V contains several miscellaneous provisions. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12201-12213.
5. Although there is a large degree of overlap among the Titles of the ADA and the
concepts that they employ, there are many slight, but significant, variations in language.
For example, although Title I requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for
employees with disabilities unless such accommodation would cause an undue hardship to
the business, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), Title III requires public accommodations to
make reasonable modifications to rules, practices, and procedures and to take any other
steps necessary to allow access by persons with disabilities unless such steps would funda-
mentally alter their business or create an undue burden, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A). Also,
because the administrative agency with the authority to promulgate regulations varies
among the Titles, the regulations are not consistent. Although the point of this Article has
applicability to each of the Titles, because of the language variations found in the statute
and the differences in the regulations under each of the Titles, it is best illustrated by
concentrating on only one Title.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
8. ADA Title I EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); ADA Title I Interpretive
Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (1996). The EEOC published the Interpretive Gui-
dance as an appendix to the regulations. Although it is not controlling upon the courts, it
does constitute "a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance." Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 672
(Ist Cir. 1995) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). The
Interpretive Guidance notes that the list of major life activities contained in the regulations
is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. It states, for instance, that sitting, standing,
lifting, and reaching are also major life activities. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
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ered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity are the nature and severity of the impairment, the
duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long-term impact
of the impairment.10
If a person is found to be an individual with a disability, the next
step is to determine whether she is a qualified individual with a disa-
bility. To be a qualified individual with a disability, an individual first
must satisfy the prerequisites for the job, such as having the appropri-
ate education, skills, and licenses. 1 The individual then must be able,
either with or without a reasonable accommodation, to perform the
essential functions of the job.' 2 In general, a job function is consid-
ered essential if the reason the job exists is to perform the function, if
there are a limited number of employees among whom the function
can be assigned, or if the function is highly specialized and the person
was hired because of her expertise or ability to perform the function.' 3
Factors to be considered in assessing whether a job function is essen-
tial include the employer's judgment as to which functions are essen-
tial, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job
performing a particular function, the consequences of not requiring
the person who holds the job to perform a particular function, the
terms of applicable collective bargaining agreements, the work experi-
ence of previous persons who held the job, and the current work expe-
rience of those who hold similar jobs.' 4
Once the essential functions of a job are ascertained, it must be
determined whether an individual can perform those functions, with
or without a reasonable accommodation. In most cases, a reasonable
accommodation is a modification or adjustment to the manner in
which a job is performed or to the work environment itself.' 5 Exam-
ples of modifications or adjustments that may be considered reason-
able accommodations include making facilities accessible or usable,
restructuring the job,16 modifying work schedules, reassigning the em-
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2). For a more detailed discussion, including examples, of
what is meant by the term "substantially limits," see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).
16. An employer restructures a job by reallocating or redistributing nonessential,
marginal job functions to other positions. An employer is not required to reallocate or
redistribute essential job functions. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
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ployee to a different position if one is vacant,17 acquiring or modifying
equipment or devices, adjusting or modifying examinations, training
materials, or policies, and providing readers or interpreters.18
The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommoda-
tions unless such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the business of the employer.19 An undue hardship is created if the
accommodation would require significant difficulty or expense.20 The
nature and cost of the accommodation, the availability of financial re-
sources, the number of employees, and the impact of the accommoda-
tion on the operation of the business are all factors to be considered in
determining whether an accommodation will cause an undue hard-
ship.2' Moreover, an employer is not obligated to make an accommo-
dation if, even with the accommodation, the employee would pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of others.22
H. Voluntary Impairments and the ADA
The purpose of the ADA is a noble one-to eliminate the dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities that has been pervasive in
our society for years. 23 In enacting the ADA, Congress found that
society had historically isolated and segregated persons with disabili-
ties, intentionally excluding them from services, activities, programs,
benefits, jobs, and other opportunities.24 As Congress noted, the dis-
crimination that has occurred has been based upon negative stere-
otypical assumptions about characteristics beyond the control of the
person with the disability and not truly indicative of that person's abil-
17. According to the Interpretive Guidance, reassignment to another position should
only be considered when there are no reasonable accommodations that could be made to
the individual's current position without causing an undue hardship to the employer. 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). See also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (providing explana-
tions and examples of some of the accommodations listed by the statute as reasonable
accommodations).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). See also 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(p) (giving examples to
illustrate what is meant by an undue hardship).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a), (b). The discrimination that the ADA is aimed at elimi-
nating includes not only intentional discrimination, but also actions and inactions that, be-
cause of thoughtlessness or indifference, have a discriminatory effect, even if not
discriminatory by design. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1990).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). This finding was based on numerous instances of dis-
crimination documented in the ADA committee reports. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess., 6-9 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 23, at 28-32.
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ities3. 5 It should be the goal of this country, Congress stated, to guar-
antee persons with disabilities "equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency. '26
The public must perceive the ADA as equitable and just if its
noble purpose is to be accomplished. If the public views the ADA as
unfair or easily susceptible to abuse, it will become cynical and will
insist that the provisions of the ADA be drastically watered down or
repealed altogether. If the critics are able to gain enough support, the
result may well be the loss of protection for those who are truly
deserving.
Unfortunately, many critics are already touting the ADA as a ve-
hicle for people with bogus or dubious disabilities to keep jobs that
they would otherwise lose or to collect undeserved damage awards or
settlements. 27 One commentator stated that "rarely do rhetoric and
reality diverge so sharply as they have in connection with the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act."2s Another opined that "[w]e've unwit-
tingly created a Frankenstein's monster that, if not restrained, will
plunder the countryside in the name of compassion, justice and civil
rights. '29 Sentiments of this type have prompted some to lobby for
the repeal of the ADA.30
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
27. Kim Norris, Rights Law Falls Short of Target, Critics Say, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 19, 1995, at 10. See also James Bovard, Very Bad Craziness and the Disabilities Act,
WASH. TIMES, July 26, 1994, at A19 (stating that the ADA creates instant empowerment to
anyone who even claims a disability); Brain Doherty, Disabilities Act: Source of Unreason-
able Accommodations, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 16, 1995, at G1 (opining that firing
for poor performance or excessive absenteeism can be difficult if the person alleges a disa-
bility, even absent medical or psychological evidence of a disability); Michael Fumento, Is
it Time to Reform the Americans with Disabilities Act? Rulings Terrorize Small Business,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Aug. 6, 1995, at G3 (expressing opinion that behaviors society
used to condemn, such as drinking to excess, can now be handsomely rewarded under the
ADA); Stephen Moore, Disabilities Act Makes a Mockery of Civil-Rights Law, LAS VEGAS
REv.-J., Apr. 24, 1994, at 1C (stating belief that "[i]rresponsible behavior is being increas-
ingly classified as a disability"); Mike Rosen, ADA Spawns Lame Lawsuits, DENVER POST,
July 14, 1995, at B1l (noting several absurd claims that have been brought under the
ADA); Michael Verespej, A Pandora's Box of Ailments, INDuSTRY WK., Apr. 18, 1994, at
61 (quoting the opinion of an attorney that anyone who wants to be taken off of a repeti-
tive job and reassigned to a light-duty job merely has to make an allegation of back injury
or carpal-tunnel syndrome); Walter E. Williams, ADA: Stranger than Fiction, BOSTON
HIERAm, Aug. 9, 1995, at 025 (characterizing several lawsuits brought under the ADA as
blatant attempts at extortion).
28. The ADA Now, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATH, July 31, 1995, at A8.
29. Michael Rosen, Reality Check on the ADA, DENVER POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at B07.
30. See, e.g., Edward B. Bennett III, Critics Distort Realities of Disabilities Act, Aus-
TEN AM. STAT=SMAN, July 26,1995, at A13 (warning that some critics of the ADA advocate
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One aspect that commentators have pointed to in criticizing the
ADA is the possibility that it affords protection to persons with volun-
tary impairments.31 Consider, for example, the following hypotheti-
cal.32 A janitor at a private high school is in a car accident and
sustains a back injury. In no way could the injury be considered the
janitor's fault-he was a passenger in the car and was properly wear-
ing his seatbelt. As a result of this injury, the janitor is unable to lift
anything over thirty pounds. Prior to his injury, the janitor was re-
quired to perform tasks that entailed lifting more than thirty pounds
about once a week. The janitor's doctor recommends that the janitor
undergo physical therapy three times a week to rehabilitate his back.
The janitor's employer agrees that it will not assign the janitor any
tasks that require lifting more than thirty pounds until he has regained
the strength in his back-it will assign all such tasks to other employ-
ees. The janitor is able to adequately perform all of his other tasks.
Six months later, the janitor has missed most of his physical therapy
sessions. The strength in his back has not improved, and he is still
unable to lift anything over thirty pounds. The janitor's employer no
longer wants to employ him if he is not able to lift more than thirty
pounds and terminates him.
its repeal or weakening); James Bovard, This Law Hassles Business, USA TODAY, July 26,
1994, at 10A (arguing for repeal of the ADA); Ron Janecke, Delegates Target ADA, Gains
Tax, ST. Louis Bus. J., May 15, 1995, at 17A (reporting that Missouri's delegation to the
White House Conference on Small Business has recommended repeal of the ADA); Mar-
sha Mercer, Corny Humor Breaks Out Among GOP Candidates, RICHMOND TirMs-Dis-
PATCH, Oct. 29, 1995, at F2 (noting that Pat Buchanan favors repeal of the ADA); Paul
Merrion, Right v. Left at Small Biz Conference, CRAIN's CHICAGO Bus., Mar. 20, 1995, at 3
(reporting that a proposal for the Illinois delegation to the White House Conference on
Small Business to recommend repeal of the ADA was narrowly defeated); Tricia Serju,
State's Small Firms Push for Disabilities Act Reform, DETROIT NEWS, June 14, 1995, at Bi
(stating that Michigan's delegation to the White House Conference on Small Business has
proposed that Congress either repeal or rewrite the ADA).
31. See e.g., Defining Disability Down, Cm. TRm., Dec. 12, 1993, at 2 (criticizing the
EEOC's position that a condition does not have to be involuntary or immutable to be
considered a disability under the ADA); Rush Limbaugh, Victim?, RICHMOND TimEs-Dis-
PATCH, Nov. 26, 1993, at A20 (questioning why labeling a condition a disability should
absolve an individual from responsibility); Daniel Seligman, Growth Situation (Expanded
Definitions of Discrimination), FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1993, at 195 (questioning why an indi-
vidual with a correctable condition should be given protection under the ADA).
32. For an actual case that is factually similar, see Ricks v. Xerox Corp., 877 F. Supp.
1468, 1471, 1474-77 (D. Kan. 1995). Although the Ricks court found (1) that the plaintiff
was not a "qualified individual" with a disability, and alternatively (2) that the accommo-
dation requested by the employee was not a "reasonable accommodation," the plaintiff's
failure to attend the physical therapy recommended by his physician was not discussed by
the court and did not appear to be a factor in its decision. However, the plaintiff stated
that physical therapy had not helped his condition in the past.
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The janitor sues, alleging that his employer violated the ADA.
The court finds that the janitor, because he is unable to lift the same
amount of weight as the average person in the general population, is
substantially limited in a major life activity as the result of a physical
impairment and is therefore an individual with a disability.3 3 The
court then determines that the tasks that require the janitor to lift
more than thirty pounds are not essential functions of his job because
they are a small part of his job and can be reassigned to other employ-
ees. Therefore, because the janitor is able to perform all the essential
functions of his job, he is a qualified person with a disability. Finally,
the court concludes that restructuring the janitor's job by reassigning
the tasks that require lifting more than thirty pounds to other employ-
ees is a reasonable accommodation that would not cause an undue
hardship. Thus, the court holds that the employer has violated the
ADA.
This scenario is not unlikely, primarily because the ADA contains
nothing that specifically requires a court to consider the actions of the
disabled person in determining whether a violation of the statute has
occurred. Yet, this result seems neither equitable nor just. The janitor
in the hypothetical has refused to help himself, while at the same time
expecting others, in this case his employer, to bear the cost of accom-
modating his disability. An employer should not be forced to bear the
cost and responsibility of making an accommodation for a disability
33. Note that some courts have recently begun to take the approach in employment
cases that an individual does not meet the definition of having a disability unless she has an
impairment that substantially limits her ability to work, which is exceedingly difficult to
prove. See, e.g., Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 883-85 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (ignoring plaintiff's inability to lift more than fifteen pounds or lift anything between
the floor and her waist and requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that she is substantially lim-
ited in the major life activity of working); Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1124, 1131-
32 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (finding that plaintiff did not have a disability because she was not
substantially limited in her ability to work, despite the fact that plaintiff could not lift over
25 pounds). These decisions appear to ignore whether the impairment substantially limits
any other major life activity. This approach is contrary to the regulations, which direct that
an inquiry be made as to whether an impairment substantially limits the major life activity
of working if the individual is not able to show that he or she is substantially limited in any
other major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). Other courts have also recognized
that this is not the correct approach. See McCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., 929 F.
Supp. 1489, 1496 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (acknowledging that a literal application of the regula-
tion allows a finding of disability if plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity,
even if not substantially limited in the major life activity of working); Bell v. Elmhurst
Chicago Stone Co., 919 F. Supp. 308,309 (N.D. Il. 1996) (rejecting cases that only focus on
plaintiff's ability to work, stating that plaintiff "need not show that his ability to work is
'substantially limited' if his ability to breathe is so limited").
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that continues to exist solely because an employee chooses not to bear
any of the cost or responsibility of mitigating it. 4
Moreover, compelling the employer to accommodate the janitor
in this hypothetical does not comport with Congress' intent in enact-
ing the ADA. Congress did not intend the ADA to relieve persons
with disabling conditions of personal responsibility. Rather, as previ-
ously stated, its purpose is to eliminate discrimination-discrimination
resulting from stereotypical assumptions regarding the abilities of per-
sons with disabilities based on characteristics that are beyond their con-
troL35 No such discrimination occurred in the hypothetical.
Now consider a slightly different situation. Assume that the
janitor in the previous hypothetical does not injure his back in a car
accident. Rather, the janitor is injured by jumping into shallow,
murky water without first checking the depth of the water. Assume
also that, unlike the first hypothetical, the janitor follows all of his
physician's advice, including diligently attending all recommended
physical therapy. Yet, despite his efforts at rehabilitation, the janitor
is still unable to lift more than thirty pounds. Finally, as in the first
hypothetical, assume that his employer fires him because of this limi-
tation, that he sues his employer under the ADA, and that the court
finds that the employer violated the ADA.
Although both of the hypotheticals involve what could be consid-
ered voluntary impairments, there are significant differences between
an impairment that results from voluntary conduct and an impairment
that continues or is exacerbated by voluntary conduct. First, in most
cases in which an impairment results from voluntary conduct, an acci-
dental factor or an element of chance is also involved. The person
cannot act with full knowledge of the outcome because the outcome is
to some degree indeterminate. Although the person may be aware
34. As Professor McCormick stated in discussing the principles behind the doctrine of
avoidable consequences:
Legal rules and doctrines are designed not only to prevent and repair individual
loss and injustice, but to protect and conserve the economic welfare and prosper-
ity of the whole community. Consequently, it is important that the rules for
awarding damages should be such as to discourage even persons against whom
wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic loss which could
be averted by reasonable efforts, or from actively increasing such loss where pru-
dence would require that such activity cease.
CHARLE=S T. McCoRncK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 33, at 127 (1935). See
also RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1977) (stating that "public policy
requires that persons should be discouraged from wasting their resources, both physical
and economic").
35. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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that the conduct in which he is engaging is dangerous or increases his
risk of harm, he probably does not know for certain that he will be
seriously injured or harmed as a result. If he knew the outcome, he
probably would have changed his course of action. Thus, although the
conduct itself may have been voluntary, it cannot be said that the per-
son voluntarily chose to be disabled.
By contrast, someone who chooses not to mitigate his condition
voluntarily chooses to be disabled. Although there may be some ele-
ment of chance with regard to whether a prescribed treatment will in
fact reduce or eliminate the impairment, a failure to act almost cer-
tainly will result in the continued existence of the condition. The per-
son knows that, as a result of his conduct, he will continue to have the
impairment or the impairment will continue to worsen. He is making
an informed, conscious decision to continue living with the impair-
ment. This is his prerogative. However, society should not be obli-
gated to bear the cost of his choice.36
A second distinction can be made based on the current status of
impairments. Again, although in both cases the impairments could be
characterized as voluntary, only in the second hypothetical is the im-
pairment immutable. There is nothing that the janitor can do to elimi-
nate his disability. Denying him the full protections of the ADA,
therefore, would not create any positive incentives for him to change
his behavior.37
In the first hypothetical, on the other hand, the impairment is not
immutable. If the janitor followed his prescribed physical therapy, he
likely would decrease the severity of his impairment, and possibly
eliminate it altogether. He may not have any incentive to do this,
however, if the ADA requires his employer to make accommodations
regardless of his conduct. Suppose that, outside of his job, he gener-
36. See Bonnie P. Tucker, Deafness-Disability or Subculture: The Emerging Con-
flict, 3 CoRNFLL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 265, 271-74 (1994). Professor Tucker argues that,
although deaf individuals have every right to choose not to "fix" their deafness, they do not
at the same time have the right to demand that society pay for the costs of their choice. As
she states, "[a]ccommodation is not required to provide equal opportunities where the
condition that renders opportunity unequal may itself be eliminated." Id. at 273. See also
Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 40, 65
(arguing that deaf people who do not characterize deafness as a disability, and therefore
object to any "cures," should not be entitled to protection under the ADA).
37. One article has noted that ignoring the cause of a disability is consistent with the
notion that the way a person becomes disabled is a private matter. Karen M. Kramer &
Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Discrimination in the Workplace: Protection Through a Per-
ceived Disability Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 31 CAL.. W. L. RFv. 41, 56 (1994).
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ally does not have occasion to lift more than thirty pounds, and while
at work, he would prefer not to perform the jobs that require lifting
more than thirty pounds.38
To assure that the janitor acts responsibly, the protections of the
ADA should be limited in the case of an individual with an impair-
ment that is not immutable, but continues to exist or is exacerbated as
the result of the individual's voluntary conduct, regardless of its
cause.3 9 This could be accomplished in one of two ways. The first
would be to interpret the term "disability" under the ADA as not in-
cluding impairments that are mutable. The second option would be to
consider the voluntary actions of a person with a mutable impairment
in determining whether an employer has satisfied its obligation under
the ADA to make a reasonable accommodation. Each of these alter-
natives will be discussed in turn.
HI. Exclusion of Mutable Impairments from the Definition
of "Disability"
A. Per Se Exclusion
As previously discussed, only individuals with disabilities are enti-
tled to protection under the ADA.40 Thus, one means of limiting the
scope of the ADA is to exclude from the definition of "disability" any
impairment that is mutable. This is in fact what some courts have
done when interpreting state laws that prohibit discrimination against
38. In essence, this is an externalities problem. Externalities are costs imposed on
others as a result of an individual's actions that the individual is not required to take into
account in his or her decision-making. See WERN~ER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 14-
16 (2d ed. 1988). Because the individual's decision is not based on an accurate cost/benefit
analysis, it often results in inefficiencies. See id In the example in the text, the janitor,
when deciding on his course of action, does not have to consider the cost to his employer of
an accommodation. The question, then, is how to cause the individual, in this case the
employee, to consider or internalize these external costs when making a decision.
39. See Andrea M. Brucoli, Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hospitals: Morbid Obesity as a Protected Disability or an Unprotected
Voluntary Condition, 28 GA. L. REv. 771, 798-800 (1994) (arguing that, although the volun-
tariness of the initial cause of an impairment should not affect the determination of
whether an individual is protected under the ADA, the current voluntary mutability of the
impairment should be relevant); Daniel Seligman, Growth Situation, FORTUNE, Dec. 13,
1993, at 195, 197-98 (distinguishing between impairments that the individual brought on
himself and impairments that are now correctable, and questioning why the government
should be providing protection in the latter case).
40. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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persons with disabilities.41 In the first of these cases, Greene v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co.,42 the court held that an obese plaintiff was not
handicapped 43 under Washington's civil rights statute" because his
condition was not immutable.45 The court reached a similar holding in
Missouri Commission on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. 46 In that case, the plaintiff was obese and suffered from
high blood pressure.47 The court found that she did not have a disabil-
ity and was not entitled to the protections of the Missouri disability
law48 because she ignored her condition and failed to take any steps to
treat or control it.49
41. See Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Missouri
Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
42. 548 F. Supp. at 5.
43. The term "disability" is now preferred over the term "handicapped," although
there is no difference in their legal meaning. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 23, at 50-51; S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 21. Because many older statutes and cases use the term
"handicapped," this Article will also use this term when discussing these statutes and cases.
44. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1996).
45. Whether obesity is a voluntary or mutable condition is controversial. See James
G. Frierson, Obesity as a Legal Disability Under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and State
Handicapped Employment Laws, 44 LAB. L.J. 286, 288-89 (1993); Scott Petersen, Discrim-
ination Against Overweight People: Can Society Still Get Away With It?, 30 GONZ. L. REv.
105, 106, 120 (1994/95); Jay R. Byers, Comment, Cook v. Rhode Island.- It's Not Over Until
the Morbidly Obese Woman Works, 20 J. CoP. L. 389,398-401 (1995); William C. Taussig,
Note, Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Disability
Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 927,
929-32 (1994); Steven M. Ziolkowski, Case Comment, The Status of Weight-Based Employ-
ment Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Cook v. Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 74 B.U. L. REv. 667, 669-72
(1994). This Article is not concerned with whether obesity is actually voluntary or muta-
ble. Rather, what is relevant for purposes of this Article is how courts treat conditions
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be voluntary or mutable.
46. 699 S.W.2d at 79.
47. Id. at 76.
48. Discriminatory Employment Practices Act, 1961 Mo. Laws 439 (repealed 1986).
49. 699 S.W.2d at 79.
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An early case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 197350 (the
"Rehabilitation Act"), Tudyman v. United Airlines,51 also determined
that impairments that are caused and continue to exist as the result of
an individual's voluntary actions do not fall within the definition of a
disability. The plaintiff in Tudyman, who was a bodybuilder, applied
to United Airlines for a position as a flight attendant, but was rejected
because his weight exceeded United's weight guidelines.52 The plain-
tiff claimed that United's rejection of his application impermissibly
discriminated against him on the basis of a handicap.53 In dismissing
the plaintiff's claim, the court emphasized that his weight was self-
imposed and voluntary.54 The court stated that the Rehabilitation Act
"was not intended to protect those with voluntary 'impairments.'"55
More recently, however, courts have adopted a different ap-
proach when confronted with the issue of whether a mutable impair-
ment can be a disability.5 6 The decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in State Division of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox
Corp.57 was the first to explicitly hold that the mutability of an impair-
ment is irrelevant to the determination of whether an individual has a
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994). The Rehabilitation Act was the first federal statute
to address discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Its application, however, is
limited to the federal government, federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds. 29
U.S.C. § 794. The ADA, although more comprehensive in its application, was modeled
after the Rehabilitation Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 485, supra note 23, at 50 (stating that the term "disability" is comparable to the
term "individual with handicaps" as used in the Rehabilitation Act), 54-55 (stating that the
range of employment decisions covered by Title I of the ADA is intended to be consistent
with regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act), 62 (directing that interpretation of
the concept of a "reasonable accommodation" is to be generally consistent with interpreta-
tions of that term under the Rehabilitation Act), 67 (noting that the concept of "undue
hardship" is derived from and should be interpreted consistently with regulations imple-
menting the Rehabilitation Act). Thus, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are
instructive and looked to for guidance in interpreting the ADA. Eckles v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996).
51. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
52. Id. at 740.
53. Id.
54. Id at 746.
55. Id.
56. See Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10
F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1993); State Div. of Human Rights ex reL McDermott v. Xerox
Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 697-99 (N.Y. 1985). See also Ricks v. Xerox Corp., 877 F. Supp.
1468, 1474-76 (D. Kan. 1995) (failing to consider plaintiff's refusal to attend physical ther-
apy recommended by his physician as a factor in analyzing whether plaintiff had a disability
under the ADA); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that plain-
tiff had a disability under the Rehabilitation Act despite plaintiff's failure to adequately
treat or control his condition).
57. 480 N.E.2d at 698.
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disability. The plaintiff in McDermott brought a claim alleging that
the defendant's refusal to hire her because she was obese was a viola-
tion of New York's Human Rights Law,58 which prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of a disability.59 In response, the defendant argued
that the Human Rights Law applies only to immutable disabilities and
does not apply to disabilities that are correctable.60 The court rejected
this argument, finding that "the statute protects all persons with disa-
bilities, and not just those with hopeless conditions. '61
The First Circuit echoed the McDermott opinion with respect to
the Rehabilitation Act in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental
Health, Retardation, and Hospitals.62 The plaintiff in Cook reapplied
for a position she had previously held with the defendant as an at-
tendant at an institution for mentally retarded persons.63 The plaintiff
had voluntarily left this same position two years earlier, and at the
time of her departure, had a spotless work record. 4 The defendant
refused to rehire the plaintiff because of her obesity, claiming, among
other things, that her weight would compromise her ability to evacu-
ate patients in an emergency.65 The plaintiff sued, alleging that the
defendant had violated the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to rehire
her.66
The defendant asserted that the plaintiff was not handicapped
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act for two reasons.67 First,
the defendant argued that mutable impairments are not protected by
the Rehabilitation Act.68 The court found it unnecessary to address
this argument, however, because the jury could have found, based on
evidence that the court determined to be credible, that the plaintiff's
condition was in fact immutable.69 Nonetheless, the court questioned
58. N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 292, subd. 21, 296, subd. 1(a) (McKinney 1996).
59. 480 N.E.2d at 696.
60. Id. at 698.
61. Id. The court thus found it unnecessary to resolve a dispute between the parties
regarding whether plaintiff's condition was the result of bad dietary habits or whether it
had a physical cause.
62. 10 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1993).
63. Id. at 20.
64. Id. The plaintiff apparently was morbidly obese during the time she previously
worked for the defendant. See Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retarda-
tion, & Hosps., 783 F. Supp. 1569, 1571 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
Thus, her obesity was not a new condition.
65. 10 F.3d at 21.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 23.
68. I&
69. Id. at 23-24.
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the conclusion of the district court that an impairment must be immu-
table to be a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act.70 The court
noted that neither the statute nor the regulations mention mutability
as an automatic disqualifier to having a protected handicap, and the
court stated that it saw no reason to impose such a requirement.71
The second argument that the defendant proffered was that obes-
ity cannot be an impairment within the scope of the Rehabilitation
Act because it is caused, or at least exacerbated, by voluntary con-
duct.72 Looking again at the language of the statute and the regula-
tions, the court emphasized that nothing therein suggests that the
cause of an individual's impairment, even if it were the individual's
own voluntary conduct, is a factor in determining whether an individ-
ual is handicapped. 73 In fact, as the court pointed out, many impair-
ments that are unquestionably protected by the Rehabilitation Act are
often caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct, such as AIDS, dia-
betes, lung cancer, and heart disease.74
Significantly, the EEOC supported the position of the First Cir-
cuit expressed in Cook.75 In an amicus brief filed with the First Cir-
cuit in Cook, the EEOC stated that "[i]t is not necessary that a
condition be involuntary or immutable to be covered under the Reha-
bilitation Act. '76 In reaching this conclusion, the EEOC relied on the
language of the statute, which it said neither demands nor even sug-
gests consideration of the cause of an impairment or whether an indi-
vidual contributed to the existence of the impairment.77 The EEOC
also noted that this approach is not unique to obesity cases, stating
that all impairments should be treated in the same manner.78
The idea that an impairment need not be involuntary or immuta-
ble to be a covered disability can also be applied to Title I of the
ADA. In its amicus brief in Cook, the EEOC indicated that its analy-
sis of voluntary or mutable impairments under the Rehabilitation Act
is equally applicable to the ADA.79 Like the Rehabilitation Act, Title
I of the ADA and the applicable regulations thereunder do not con-
70. iL at 23 n.7.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 24.
73. Id.
74. Id-
75. See Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Cook, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 93-
1093).
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 10-11.
79. Id. at 16.
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tain any language to suggest that either voluntary or mutable impair-
ments are excluded from the term "disability" as used in the statute.80
The legislative history of the ADA provides further evidence that
Congress did not intend voluntary or mutable impairments to be auto-
matically excluded from the term "disability." The House Report on
the ADA explicitly states that "[t]he cause of a disability is always
irrelevant to the determination of disability."81 In addition, the Sen-
ate Report lists specific conditions that will always be considered disa-
bilities,82 including being infected with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ("HIV"). 3 Further, in the Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC
also states that an individual with }LIV is conclusively presumed to
have a disability.84 There is no indication that either of these pre-
sumptions would be altered if an individual contracted the virus as a
result of the individual's voluntarily having unprotected intercourse or
if the individual refused to follow doctor's orders to minimize the ef-
fect of the virus.
Other examples of disabilities described in the Senate Report are
being paraplegic and being deaf.8 5 Both of these conditions could
have been caused by a voluntary act. A person may be a paraplegic
because she was injured while skiing recklessly. Similarly, a person
may be deaf because he played in a rock band for twenty-five years
without wearing proper ear protection. Both of these conditions may
be "curable" through physical therapy or through surgery. Again,
however, nothing in the ADA suggests that either of these conditions
would not be considered a disability if it were in fact caused by a vol-
untary act or if it were in fact mutable.8 6
Thus, recent case law, the legislative history of the ADA, and the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA all suggest that mutable impair-
ments are not to be automatically excluded from the definition of dis-
ability. Although one could argue that the courts and the EEOC
80. See id.
81. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 23, at 29.
82. S. RaP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22.
83. Id.
84. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
85. S. RElP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22.
86. The Senate Report also lists a variety of conditions as impairments that would be
considered disabilities if they were severe enough to result in a substantial limitation of a
major life activity. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22. This list contains many condi-
tions, such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes, that can be caused by voluntary action,
continue to exist as the result of voluntary action, or can be exacerbated by voluntary
action. Id Yet, none of these factors would appear to affect the characterization of these
conditions as impairments or disabilities.
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should reverse their position, such an argument is unlikely to succeed
because virtually no authority exists to support this position. If any
change were to be made, Congress would probably be the entity to
initiate it.
A per se exclusion of mutable conditions from the definition of
disability, however, is not desirable for another reason. Such an ex-
clusion is not desirable because it would automatically exclude an in-
dividual with a mutable disability from protection under the ADA
without considering other relevant factors, such as the reasonableness
of the action necessary to eliminate or reduce the disabling condition.
Obvious factors, such as the cost, risks, and likelihood of success of
the mitigating action, would be ignored. Another important factor
that would not enter into the equation is the burden to the employer
of making an accommodation. Failure to consider these factors would
likely lead to inefficient results.
As an illustration, return to the previous example of the janitor
who injured his back. Assume that instead of physical therapy, sur-
gery, costing thousands of dollars, is required to alleviate his condi-
tion. Also assume that the cost to the janitor's employer of
accommodating his inability to lift more than thirty pounds is approxi-
mately $200 per year. If mutable impairments were automatically ex-
cluded from the definition of "disability," the janitor would not be
covered under the ADA. Thus, he would be forced to choose be-
tween undergoing the costly surgery or losing his job, despite the fact
that his employer could accommodate his condition for a fraction of
the cost of the surgery.
It is feasible to formulate a definition of disability in which muta-
bility, as well as factors such as the cost, time, and likelihood of suc-
cess of a mitigating action, are considered. However, to factor into
the definition of disability the cost to an employer of making an ac-
commodation seems incongruous. If this cost were a factor, it could
lead to the bizarre result that an individual would be regarded as an
individual with a disability in one context, but not in another, with the
sole variant being the cost to the employer of accommodating the con-
dition. Not only is it clear from the structure of the ADA that the cost
of an accommodation is to be considered separately from the determi-
nation of a disability, but also to create a definition of disability this
fluid would be confusing and illogical. Thus, a better approach is
needed.
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B. The Relevance of Mutability in Determining Whether a Major Life
Activity Has Been Substantially Limited
Even absent a per se exclusion of mutable impairments from the
definition of disability, a court could nonetheless find that some muta-
ble impairments do not constitute disabilities because they do not sub-
stantially limit a major life activity. As previously discussed, the ADA
defines disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity.87 Three factors that enter into a determination of
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity
are the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration of the im-
pairment, and the permanent or long-term impact of the impair-
ment.88 Mutability is relevant to each of these factors and thus is
relevant to a finding of disability.8 9
Although relevant, a finding of mutability is not determinative.
Merely because an impairment is capable of being eliminated or re-
duced does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the impairment
does not substantially limit a major life activity, and is therefore not a
disability. The First Circuit in Cook 90 indicated that mutability pre-
cludes a finding of disability only if the impairment can easily and
quickly be reversed.91 On the one hand, this may eliminate a concern
associated with a per se exclusion by injecting an element of reasona-
bleness into the formula. Presumably, if an impairment could be eas-
ily and quickly reversed, it would be reasonable to expect the
individual with the impairment to take the necessary actions to re-
verse the impairment.
On the other hand, many impairments, while reversible, are inca-
pable of being easily and quickly reversed. For example, a person
who suffers a spinal injury and loses use of his legs may be able to
walk again, but only after numerous operations and years of intense
physical therapy. Furthermore, other impairments may be mutable in
the sense that they can be reduced or minimized, but are not capable
of being altogether reversed. For example, a person with diabetes
may be able to reduce the effects of the disease by following a pre-
87. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
89. See Cook, 10 F.3d at 23 n.7; Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 16, Cook, 10 F.3d
17 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1093).
90. 10 F.3d at 23 n.7.
91. See also Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 16, Cook, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993)
(No. 93-1093) (stating that "[v]oluntariness is relevant to determining whether an impair-
ment is substantially limiting only where an individual can easily and quickly reverse the
condition by changing his or her behavior").
[Vol. 48HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
VOLUNTARY DISABILITIES AND THE ADA
scribed diet, yet she will always be diabetic. Thus, although requiring
that an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity to be a
disability may prevent some abuse of the ADA, it will only do so with
respect to individuals with mutable impairments that can easily and
quickly be reversed. Therefore, this requirement at best offers only a
partial solution.
IV. A Reasonable Interpretation of "Reasonable
Accommodations"
A. Current Status of the Law
A second means of limiting the ADA's protections with respect
to mutable disabilities is to consider the conduct of the disabled indi-
vidual as a factor in determining whether her employer has satisfied
its duty of making a reasonable accommodation. Focus in this in-
stance is placed on the term "reasonable." Guidance as to what is
meant by the term "reasonable" as a modifier of "accommodation" is
scarce. The statute lists several types of accommodations that an em-
ployer may be required to make to enable an employee with a disabil-
ity to perform the essential functions of a job.92 However, the statute
does not describe the circumstances under which any of these accom-
modations would be considered reasonable or unreasonable.93 The
regulations, in addition to listing types of accommodations that an em-
ployer may be required to make, explain when accommodations
should be made and how an appropriate accommodation can be iden-
tified.94 As with the statute, however, they do not discuss how to de-
termine whether a particular accommodation is reasonable. 95
Most courts that have addressed the issue of whether an em-
ployer has violated the ADA by failing to make a reasonable accom-
modation have ignored the question of whether a proposed
accommodation is reasonable. Instead, courts have focused primarily
on whether the employer has a valid defense for not making the ac-
commodation-namely that the accommodation would not enable the
individual to perform all the essential functions of the job,96 the ac-
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
95. See id.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). In order for an employer to be required to make an
accommodation, the applicant or employee must be a qualified individual with a disability.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. To be a qualified individual with a disability, the individual must be
able, with or without a reasonable accommodation, to perform all the essential functions of
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commodation would cause an undue hardship to the employer,97 or
the individual with a disability, even with an accommodation, would
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others.98 Nonetheless,
an accommodation that enables an employee to perform all the essen-
tial functions of the job without imposing an undue hardship on the
employer and without posing a direct threat to the health or safety of
others may not be reasonable.
The Seventh Circuit recognized this argument in Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Department of Administration.99 The plaintiff in Vande
Zande unsuccessfully argued that "reasonable," as it modifies "accom-
modation" under the ADA, means nothing more than appropriate or
effective.'0 0 Factors such as cost, she claimed, are irrelevant to a de-
termination of whether an accommodation is reasonable. 01 Accord-
ing to the plaintiff, cost comes into the analysis only at the stage of
determining whether an accommodation will impose an undue
hardship. 0 2
the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Thus, an employer is not required to make an accom-
modation if there is no reasonable accommodation that will enable the individual to per-
form all the essential functions of the job. For examples of cases involving a question of
whether an employee is able to perform the essential functions of a job, see Gore v. GTE
South, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1564, 1571-73 (M.D. Ala. 1996), Miller v. Department of Correc-
tions, 916 F. Supp. 863, 866-69 (C.D. Ill. 1996), and Miller v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc.,
894 F. Supp. 1463, 1467-69 (D. Kan. 1995).
97. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A). An employer is required to make
reasonable accommodations to the known limitations of a qualified individual with a disa-
bility unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's
business. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). "Undue hardship" is defined as "an action re-
quiring significant difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). In analyzing whether
an accommodation would impose an undue hardship, the employer's ability to bear the
cost is a primary consideration. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). For examples of cases in-
volving the question of whether a proposed accommodation would cause an undue hard-
ship, see Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 780-81 (E.D. Tex. 1996),
Bryant v. Better Business Bureau, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 738-41 (D. Md. 1996), and Rob-
ertson v. Alabama Department of Economic & Community Affairs, 902 F. Supp. 1473,
1484-85 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b). It is a defense to a charge of discrimination under
Title I of the ADA that the employer was utilizing a qualification standard that is job-
related and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). That an individual
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace is an acceptable
qualification standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). For examples of cases involving the
question of whether an individual with a disability posed a direct threat to the health and
safety of others, see EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1170-72 (E.D. Mich.
1996), EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 428-29 (W.D. Va. 1996), and Scoles
v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
99. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 542.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The court disagreed. 103 The court stated that to accommodate a
disability means to make some change that will enable an individual
with a disability to perform the essential functions of a job.' 4 If a
change is inappropriate or ineffective, it is not an accommodation. 05
Thus, the court reasoned that if the term "reasonable" is to be given
any meaning it must qualify what is meant by "accommodations.' 10 6
In other words, "reasonable" must mean something other than appro-
priate or effective, which are already embodied within the concept of
accommodation.
The court recognized that generally when the term "reasonable"
is used, it is meant to weaken the duty required. 07 As an illustration,
the court noted that "reasonable effort" means less than the maximum
possible effort.' 08 The court stated that similar reasoning could be ap-
plied to the meaning of the word "reasonable" as used in the term
"reasonable accommodations."1 09 The ADA, therefore, does not re-
quire employers to make every conceivable accommodation. Rather,
their obligation is something less. In assessing whether an accommo-
dation satisfies the reasonableness test under the ADA, the court in
Vande Zande indicated that a cost-benefit analysis is appropriate." 0
Thus, an accommodation for which the cost is disproportionate to the
benefit may not be reasonable even if the cost would not cause an
undue hardship to the employer."'
The court in Vande Zande concluded that the defendant was not
required to lower a sink in an employee breakroom to permit use by-
the plaintiff, who was in a wheelchair. 1 2 The court reached this con-
103. Id. at 542-43.
104. Id. at 542.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id. See also Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
term "reasonable accommodation" as used in section 3604(f) of the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (1994), "does not entail an obligation to do
everything humanly possible to accommodate a disabled person").
110. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542. See also Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512,
1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that determination of reasonableness involves common
sense balancing of costs and benefits to both employer and employee); Borkowski v. Valley
Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that an accommodation, even if
effective, may be unreasonable if its cost is disproportionate to the benefits it produces);
Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429 (interpreting the term "reasonable accommodation" as used in
§ 3604(f) of the FHAA as including a cost-benefit analysis).
111. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43.
112. Id. at 546.
November 1996] VOLUNTARY DISABILITIS AND THE ADA
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
clusion, even though the cost was only $150, because there was a
nearby bathroom sink that was accessible to the plaintiff.113 Despite
the fact that $150 would clearly not impose an undue hardship on the
defendant, the court determined that the accommodation requested
by the plaintiff was unreasonable in light of the surrounding
circumstances.' 1 4
B. A Proposal
If the term "reasonable" as a modifier of the term "accommoda-
tion" is to be given meaning, then the burden placed on employers
under Title I of the ADA must be something less than requiring them
to make any possible accommodation. The next question, then, is
under what circumstances can an employer refuse to make an accom-
modation because the accommodation is not reasonable. The court in
Vande Zande suggested that an accommodation is not reasonable if
the cost of making the accommodation is disproportionate to the ben-
efit that it would produce." 5 In accordance with the cost-benefit anal-
ysis discussed in Vande Zande, I propose that an accommodation also
may not be reasonable if the individual with the disability has a muta-
ble impairment and refuses or fails to take reasonable steps to im-
prove or eliminate the condition.
Although no court has specifically endorsed this proposition,
there is some authority to support it. In D'Amico v. New York State
Board of Law Examiners,"6 the court stated its opinion that the na-
ture and extent of the disability is an important factor in determining
whether an accommodation is reasonable. Mutability clearly relates
to the nature and extent of the disability.
In addition, some decisions have indicated that the conduct of the
employee is a factor in determining whether an employer has violated
the ADA."17 Crane v. Lewis, a case decided under the Rehabilitation
Act, involved an employee with a hearing disability." 8 The court
found that the defendant had violated the Rehabilitation Act by fail-
ing to suggest to the plaintiff that he use a compensatory device, such
as a hearing aid or a telephone amplification device, that could enable
113. Id
114. See id.
115. Id. at 542.
116. 813 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
117. See, e.g., Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1995);
Crane v. Lewis, 551 F. Supp. 27, 31-32 (D.D.C. 1982).
118. Crane, 551 F. Supp. at 28.
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him to perform his job."19 The court stated, however, that if the em-
ployee refused to use such a compensatory device, then no further
actions would be required by the defendant.120
The court in Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights applied simi-
lar reasoning.' 2 ' The plaintiff in Siefken was a police officer with dia-
betes.'2 He was fired after he experienced a diabetic reaction that
resulted in his driving his squad car erratically and at high speeds
through residential areas.'23 The court found that an employee does
not have a cause of action under the ADA if he is dismissed due to his
own failure to control a controllable disability. 24
The existence of a mutable disability should not, however, auto-
matically lead a court to conclude that any accommodation would be
unreasonable. Rather, courts should consider all the facts and circum-
stances in determining whether it is reasonable to require the individ-
ual to take the action needed to eliminate, reduce, or prevent the
exacerbation of the disability. If a court finds that it is not reasonable
to require the employee to undergo the mitigating action, then the
employer would be required to make an accommodation, provided
that doing so otherwise fits within the parameters of the ADA. Con-
versely, if a court finds that the mitigating action is reasonable, then
the only accommodation that an employer would be required to make
is one necessary to permit the employee to take the mitigating action,
again assuming that it otherwise fits within the parameters of the
ADA, with one exception.
If the mitigating action is found to be reasonable, but there is a
viable accommodation that could be made, the employee could
choose to forego the mitigating action and the employer would be re-
quired to provide the accommodation, but at the employee's cost.
This not only gives the employee some freedom of choice, but also
promotes economic efficiency. A previous example was given in
which the condition of a janitor with an injured back could be elimi-
nated by a surgical procedure that cost thousands of dollars. At the
same time, an accommodation was available for a cost of $200 per
119. Id. at 31.
120. Id. at 31-32.
121. See Siefken, 65 F.3d at 665.
122. Id. at 666.
123. Id- at 665.
124. Id. at 667. See also Franklin v. United States Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding that defendant's firing of plaintiff was not discriminatory under
the Rehabilitation Act because it was plaintiff's election not to take her medication that
resulted in incidents leading to her firing).
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year. The janitor had very little reason to have the surgery other than
in connection with his ability to perform his job. In this scenario, the
janitor could choose not to undergo the more costly surgery and in-
stead reimburse his employer for the cost of the accommodation,
which the employer would then be required to make.
C. Delineating When It Is Reasonable To Require a Mitigating Action
The rule of avoidable consequences as it has developed under
tort law provides a helpful guide for ascertaining when it is reasonable
to require an individual with a disability to take a mitigating action. 12-
The general premise of the rule of avoidable consequences is that a
party should not be awarded a recovery for losses that she reasonably
could have avoided. 126 Its purpose is similar to the purpose behind
the proposal for limiting coverage under the ADA when an individual
has a mutable impairment-to discourage persons from passively suf-
fering losses that could be averted by reasonable efforts and from ac-
tively increasing such losses where prudence would require that such
activity cease.127
Thus, under the rule of avoidable consequences, a plaintiff's dam-
ages are reduced only to the extent that losses could have been
avoided through reasonable efforts. 128 An individual "is not required
to accept great risks, undertake heroic measures, or accept great per-
sonal sacrifices."' 2 9 Rather, an individual is only obligated130 to take
125. Likewise, worker's compensation cases may prove helpful. Generally, worker's
compensation laws permit an employer to refute a claimant's assertion that she is perma-
nently disabled with evidence that the claimant unreasonably failed to follow medical ad-
vice or refused medical treatment. See, e.g., Nelson v. EBI Cos., 674 P.2d 596,599-600 (Or.
1984).
126. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 33, at 127. Accord Yarrow v. United States, 309 F.
Supp. 922, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Jancura v. Szwed, 407 A.2d 961, 963 (Conn. 1978); Reeves
v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 304 So. 2d 370,375 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Couture v. Novotny, 211
N.W.2d 172, 174 (Minn. 1973); Stipp v. Karasawa, 318 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo. 1958); Auto-
matic Merchandisers, Inc. v. Ward, 646 P.2d 553, 554 (Nev. 1982); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545
A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. 1988); Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73-74 (N.C. 1968); Booth Tank
Co. v. Symes, 394 P.2d 493, 496 (Okla. 1964); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 513 P.2d 1167, 1169
(Or. 1973); Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1967).
The rule of avoidable consequences is frequently referred to as a duty to mitigate or
minimize damages, although, as Professor McCormick points out, this is somewhat of a
misnomer. See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 33, at 128.
127. See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 33, at 127. See also RESTA-TEmEN-r (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1977) (explaining that rule of avoidable consequences denies re-
covery for harm because harm is in part the result of injured person's lack of care, and
public policy requires that persons should be discouraged from wasting resources).
128. See DAN B. DoBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 271 (1993).
129. Id. at 272. Accord RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 918 cmts. d and e (1977).
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those actions that an ordinarily prudent person would take under the
circumstances in an effort to better his condition.131 The risk in-
volved, the pain involved, the probability of success, the cost, and the
amount of effort required are all considered.132 In evaluating the rea-
sonableness of the mitigating action, these considerations are weighed
against the consequences of not taking the mitigating action. 133
Therefore, in most circumstances, an injured person is required,
at a minimum, to seek medical care and to follow the advice of the
physician consulted.1' This includes taking prescribed medication, 35
following a recommended physical therapy regimen,136 and refraining
130. In using terms such as "obligated," "required," and "must," I do not mean to
suggest that a person can be forced to do these things. What I do mean is that a person will
not be fully compensated for his or her losses if he or she fails or refuses to do these things.
131. Jacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So. 2d 843,845-46 (La. 1983); Favier v.
Winick, 583 N.Y.S.2d 907,908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 513 P.2d 1167,
1170 (Or. 1973); Yost v. Union R.R., 551 A.2d 317, 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Rusoff v.
O'Brien, 206 A.2d 209, 212 (R.I. 1965); Lobermeier v. General Tel. Co., 349 N.W.2d 466,
476 (Wis. 1984). Accord RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 918 cmt. c (1977). See also
Yarrow v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 922, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("[a] person who has suf-
fered by reason of a defendant's negligence is bound to use reasonable and proper effort to
make the damage as small as practicable and to act in good faith to adopt reasonable
methods to restore himself"); Preston v. Keith, 584 A.2d 439,441 (Conn. 1991) ("[w]e have
long adhered to the rule that one who has been injured by the negligence of another must
use reasonable care to promote recovery and prevent any aggravation or increase of the
injuries") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d
524, 531 (Me. 1978) (stating rule that person injured through negligence of another has
duty to minimize damages and use reasonable diligence to secure medical or surgical aid).
132. Lucas v. Deville, 385 So. 2d 804,815 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Zimmerman, 513 P.2d at
1170. Accord DOBBS, supra note 128, § 3.9, at 272-73.
133. Lucas, 385 So. 2d at 815. See also Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (noting that gravity of current condition is factor to be considered in deter-
mining reasonableness of plaintiff's refusal to be treated).
134. See Casimere v. Herman, 137 N.W.2d 73, 78 (Wis. 1965). See also Dohmann v.
Richard, 282 So. 2d 789, 793 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (stating rule that injured person must
minimize damages by accepting customary, non-dangerous medical treatment recom-
mended by physician); Stipp v. Karasawa, 318 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 1958) (upholding jury
determination that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care to minimize damages when
he failed to procure proper medical attention); Booth Tank Co. v. Symes, 394 P.2d 493,
495-96 (Okla. 1964) (upholding jury instruction on mitigation of damages when plaintiff
refused medical treatment and evidence was presented that this worsened her condition);
Collova v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 740, 742-43 (Wis. 1959) (relying on
plaintiff's refusal to seek appropriate medical care and failure to follow the advice of physi-
cians in refusing to set aside damage award as inadequate).
135. See e.g., Keans v. Bottiarelli, 645 A.2d 1029, 1031 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (af-
firming finding of trial court that plaintiff failed to take reasonable action to lessen dam-
ages by neglecting to take prescribed medication and otherwise not following physician's
instructions).
136. See, e.g., Reeves v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 304 So. 2d 370,376 (La. Ct. App. 1974)
(refusing to increase plaintiffs damage award when injuries resulted from plaintiff's failure
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from engaging in specified activities. 137 In Casimere v. Herman,138 for
instance, the court, citing to the duty to exercise reasonable care to
minimize damages, found that the plaintiff was not entitled to dam-
ages for a permanent disability when she failed to follow a course of
exercises prescribed by her physician that would have alleviated her
back pain.139 The court stated that the defendant "cannot be expected
to pay for a lifetime's disability or pain if proper medical treatment...
can reasonably correct the [plaintiff's] ailments.' 40
Similarly, the court in Rusoff v. O'Brien'41 upheld a lower court
decision denying damages to the plaintiff for a permanent injury. 42
The plaintiff, despite his physician's advice not to engage in strenuous
activities, had lifted an anchor, changed a tire, and carried a heavy
suitcase. 143 The plaintiff claimed that at least some of these activities
were necessary for his business.144 The court found that this was not a
sufficient reason for the plaintiff to breach his obligation to act with
due regard for his own recovery.145
Nonetheless, a cost-benefit analysis is always involved, and in ex-
traordinary situations treatments such as taking prescribed medica-
tion, following a recommended physical therapy regimen, or
refraining from engaging in specified activities might not be consid-
ered reasonable. For example, in Williams v. Reading & Bates Drilling
Co.,146 the plaintiff suffered from a skin condition on his foot that was
to fully adhere to his doctor's recommended rehabilitative exercise program); Snead v.
Holloman, 400 S.E.2d 91, 94 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (remanding to trial court based on trial
court's failure to give jury instruction on mitigation of damages when there was evidence
that plaintiff had refused to follow prescribed exercise regimen); Casimere, 137 N.W.2d at
78 (refusing to compensate plaintiff for a permanent disability when following course of
exercises prescribed by her physician could have alleviated her ailments).
137. See, ag., Starnes v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 598 So. 2d 472,478 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that plaintiff did not exercise due care not to aggravate injuries when he played
volleyball without wearing knee brace against advice of physician); Holtman v. Reese, 460
S.E.2d 338, 341 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's jury charge on doctrine of
avoidable consequences when plaintiff engaged in high-impact aerobics, snow-skiing, and
water-skiing against advice of chiropractor); Rusoff v. O'Brien, 206 A.2d 209, 212 (R.I.
1965) (finding that plaintiff failed to act reasonably to minimize damages because he fre-
quently engaged in strenuous activities against advice of doctors).
138. 137 N.W.2d 73 (Wis. 1965).
139. Id. at 78.
140. Id.
141. 206 A.2d 209 (R.I. 1965).
142. Id. at 212.
143. Id. at 210.
144. Id. at 212.
145. Id.
146. 750 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1985).
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the result of a previous injury.147 The condition was treatable through
systemic steroid injections.148 The plaintiff refused to receive the ster-
oids, however, because they were likely to cause severe side effects,
such as hypertension, ulceration of the stomach, and thinning of the
bones. 149 The court found that the plaintiffs refusal of the steroid
treatment was not unreasonable under the circumstances. 50
Although the analysis remains the same, greater scrutiny is dic-
tated when the mitigating action requires surgery for the obvious rea-
son that surgery is more likely to involve significant risk, pain, and
expense. Nevertheless, the analysis is possible and courts frequently
engage in it in personal injury cases. Generally, an injured person will
not be required to undergo surgery if there is more than a slight risk
that the surgery will result in death, an aggravation of the existing
condition, or the development of a new health problem. 51 Thus, in
Sarantis v. Sheraton Corp.,152 the court found that it was not unreason-
able for the plaintiff to refuse surgery where there was a twenty-five
percent chance that her condition either would not improve or would
worsen as a result of the surgery. 53 In addition, because of the risks
inherent in any surgical procedure, it also is not unreasonable for an
injured person to refuse surgery if the prospect for improvement is
minimal. 5 4 For example, the plaintiff in Fitzpatrick v. United States' 55
was not obligated to undergo a surgical procedure when it was uncer-
tain whether the procedure would alleviate her pain or improve her
condition.'5 6 On the other hand, if an injury can be cured or allevi-
147. IL at 489.
148. lId at 490.
149. i&
150. Id.
151. See Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 522 P.2d 596, 600 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974);
Hall v. Dumitru, 620 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS § 918 cmt. d (1977).
152. 688 P.2d 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
153. Id. at 103. See also Horton v. McCrary, 620 So. 2d 918, 933 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that plaintiff was not obligated to undergo surgery to correct double vision in one
eye when there was risk that surgery could adversely affect both of his eyes).
154. See Hildyard, 522 P.2d at 600; Hall, 620 N.E.2d at 673; PSTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d (1977).
155. 754 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Del. 1991).
156. Id. at 1039. See also Stark v. Shell Oil Co., 450 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that it was not unreasonable for plaintiff to refuse surgery when it did not offer a
reasonable possibility for improvement); McGinley v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 62, 66
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (finding it not unreasonable for plaintiff to refuse surgery where, if ques-
tionable diagnosis was correct, surgery had only a 60-70% success rate, and if diagnosis was
incorrect, surgery would not relieve condition at all). Cf Futterlieb v. Mr. Happy's, Inc.,
548 A.2d 728, 731 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (finding in error trial court's decision not to give
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ated by a simple and safe surgical operation, then a refusal to undergo
such a procedure is unreasonable.157 In Jenkins v. American Automo-
bile Insurance Co.,158 for instance, the court found that it was not just
or equitable to compel the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff
who refused to submit to a surgical procedure that did not involve
undue pain, was not regarded as presenting any serious danger, and
was almost always successful.159
Personal injury cases and the rule of avoidable consequences also
provide guidance for how to treat some of the more controversial is-
sues likely to arise under the ADA, such as obesity and smoking.
With respect to both of these issues, courts have taken the approach
that an injured person satisfies his obligation to minimize damages if
he makes a reasonable effort either to lose weight 160 or quit smok-
ing,161 as the case may be. Whether the individual ultimately is suc-
cessful is not of primary relevance.1 62 For example, the plaintiff in
Blanchard v. Means Industries, Inc. injured his back in an accident and
underwent surgery in an attempt to correct his condition.163 The
plaintiff's heavy smoking, however, may have been preventing his
back from properly healing, and his physician advised him to quit.' 64
Although the plaintiff had not been able to quit smoking completely,
he was successful in substantially reducing the number of cigarettes
that he smoked per day.165 The court found that he had made suffi-
cient effort to mitigate his damages. 66 Likewise, in Close v. New
York,1 67 the court determined that the plaintiff had fulfilled her obli-
jury instruction on mitigation of damages when plaintiff refused to submit to surgery that
would have enabled him to walk without crutches and reduced his pain).
157. McGinley v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 62, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuches v. S.E.S.
Co., 459 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
158. 111 So. 2d 837 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
159. Id. at 840-41. See also Young v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 291 F. Supp.
447, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by refusing to
undergo a simple and safe surgical procedure that had reasonable chance of success); Yosuf
v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 441 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that plaintiff did not miti-
gate damages because he refused to have safe surgical procedure recommended by
physician).
160. See Tanberg v. Ackerman Inv. Co., 473 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1991); Close v.
New York, 456 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
161. See Blanchard v. Means Indus., Inc., 635 So. 2d 288, 293-94 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
162. Tanberg, 473 N.W.2d at 196; Close, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 439. See Blanchard, 635 So. 2d
at 293-94.
163. Blanchard, 635 So. 2d at 290.
164. Id. at 293-94.
165. Id. at 294.
166. Id.
167. Close v. New York, 456 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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gation to lose weight, even though she had not lost all the weight that
her doctor recommended. 168 She had lost some weight and the court
found that she had made a good faith effort to lose additional
weight.169
This type of analysis is very appealing because it eliminates the
difficult question of whether the continued existence of a condition is
in fact voluntary.170 The injured person is required to make reason-
able attempts to improve her condition. If she is able to lose weight or
quit smoking, then the continued existence of the condition must have
been the result of her own conduct. Injured persons will not be penal-
ized, however, if they are unable to actually lose weight or quit smok-
ing. It is only if they fail to make a reasonable effort to follow a
treatment plan recommended by their physician, which may include
such things as wearing a nicotine patch for smokers or following a
specified diet and exercise program for overweight individuals, will
they be found not to have mitigated their damages.
By following the principles that have developed under the rule of
avoidable consequences, it should not be difficult to assess whether an
individual with a mutable impairment has taken all reasonable actions
to minimize his condition. If the individual has not, then it will not be
reasonable under any circumstances for his or her employer to bear
the cost of an accommodation. Thus, the burden on an employer to
make an accommodation under the ADA will arise only if the individ-
ual with the disability has first made all reasonable efforts to help him-
self. This will eliminate any potential for abuse and leave us with a
result that is fair, just, and efficient.
Conclusion
If left unchecked, the tentacles of the ADA have the potential to
reach much farther and much wider than our sense of fairness and
justice would dictate. This Article has identified one aspect of the
ADA that needs to be reined in-the protections offered under the
ADA to individuals with mutable impairments. This Article has also
168. Id, at 439.
169. Id. Cf. Muller v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 337 F. Supp. 700, 706 (E.D. La. 1972)
(finding that plaintiff, who cooperated in weight loss program for five months, but then
grew tired of it and discontinued treatment, regaining all previously lost weight, failed to
mitigate damages); Tanberg v. Ackerman Inv. Co., 473 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1991) (hold-
ing that where a plaintiff is not as faithful in following his diet as he should have been, a
jury could find that he did not reasonably mitigate his damages).
170. Concededly, this analysis may raise some difficult evidentiary problems, particu-
larly in connection with whether an individual has followed a prescribed diet.
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offered a means of properly limiting the scope of the ADA in this
context-requiring employers to bear the cost of an accommodation
only if the individual with the disability first has taken all reasonable
steps to eliminate or reduce his impairment. This solution can easily
be implemented by including as a factor in the assessment of what
constitutes a "reasonable accommodation" the conduct of the em-
ployee with a mutable impairment.
The burden is on the EEOC and the courts to act. The EEOC
should promptly issue regulations requiring interpretation of the term
"reasonable accommodations" in the manner set forth in this Article.
Courts also have the ability to interpret the meaning of the term "rea-
sonable accommodations." Following the lead of the Seventh Circuit
in Vande Zande, courts should give more weight to the word "reason-
able" as a modifier of "accommodation." If faced with an individual
with a mutable impairment and the question of what constitutes a rea-
sonable accommodation, courts should take the opportunity to ana-
lyze the issue consistently with the solution this Article proposed. If
these suggestions are followed, the only losers will be those who
would seek to take unfair advantage of the ADA.
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